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I. STATEMENT OF FACTSIPROCEDURAL mSTORY 
The facts are largely not in dispute with few exceptions (that Appellant will address below). 
The Respondent has not alleged any fact that disputes the facts set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
"The review of a trial court's decision after a court trial is limited to ascertaining whether 
the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the fmdings of fact support the conclusions 
of law." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Company, Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 735, 152 P.3d 604, 606 
(2006). 
"In reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law, however, a different standard applies: this 
court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions 
from the facts presented." Id; citing Idaho Forrest Industries, Inc. v. Hidden Lake Watershed 
Improvement District, 135 Idaho 316, 319, 17 P.3d 260, 263 (2000). 
When reviewing mixed issues of law and fact, the Appellate Court reviews "freely" those 
mixed issues of law and fact. Havelick v. Chobot, 123 Idaho 714, 717, 851 P.2d 1010, 1013 
(App.1993). 
This Appeal is largely about the Conclusions of Law or mixed issues of law and fact and 
this Court reviews those fmdings freely. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction over Cathie 
The Department's position is that because Cathie was Personal Representative of 
the Estate the Court acquired personal jurisdiction over Cathie with regard to all matters, not just 
Estate proceedings. 
"A judgment entered without meeting the jurisdictional requirements of service of process 
or due process deprives the court of jurisdiction over the person and is void." McGloon v. Gwynn, 
140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621,623 (2004). 
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Idaho Code §15-3-602 provides that by accepting appointment, the Personal Representative 
"submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may 
be instituted by any interested person." I.e. §15-3-602 (2013) The Uniform Law Comments 
further explain that this provision is intended to prevent the personal representative from avoiding 
service of process on Estate matters by requiring the "appointee to consent in advance to the 
personal jurisdiction of the Court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted 
against him." I.C. §15-3-602 (2013) [Uniform Law comments]. The statute and comments make 
clear that the consent to jurisdiction that accompanies appointment as Personal Representative only 
applies to "estate matters" instituted by interested persons against the appointee in his capacity as 
Personal Representative of that estate. It does not mean the Personal Representative submits his 
personal affairs and assets to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
In this matter, the Department argues that because Cathie was appointed as Personal 
Representative, she consented to personal jurisdiction of the Court over all matters, including the 
Department's attempt to acquire the property titled to Cathie by Gift Deed years earlier on 
December 5, 2001. It should be clear that such an attempt to deprive Cathy of her property interest 
is entitled to due process of law. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 1. Personal jurisdiction is acquired by 
service of process as required by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4. That did not occur in this 
case. 
The Department argues that Cathie is Melvin's daughter and therefore "not a stranger" and 
that fact somehow brings her under the personal jurisdiction of the court. The Department asserts 
by footnote that the Court "reminded" Cathy that as Personal Representative she would be 
obligated to serve herself with lawsuit on the Department's claim to her property. Respondent's 
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Brief, P. 5, footnote #2. This statement is nonsensical. The Department is asserting an ownership 
interest in Cathie's home deeded to her in 2001. Cathie had no obligation, as Personal 
Representative, to serve herself (individually) with the Department's disputed claim to an asset 
titled outside the Estate and that the Department now admits exceeds the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the probate court. 1 
The Department proffers nothing to this Court which would give evidence of its jurisdiction 
over Cathie Peterson, individually. The Court should bear in mind that Cathie had an untenable 
choice after the Department caused her to be removed as Personal Representative: either decline to 
participate further and thereby risk losing her home, or participate reserving jurisdictional issues. 
Cathie chose the latter, but did so specifically reserving those jurisdictional issues. The 
Department's arguments to the contrary are simply unavailing. 
C. The June 12, 2008 Order 
The Department insists on raising an issue concerning the June 12,2008 Order On Petition 
to Require Payment of Claim, asserting that it was not appealed and limits the issues on this appeal. 
R. Vol. 1. Pp. 79-80. This argument is in error for a number of reasons. 
The Estate filed a Notice of Appeal to the District Court on August 20,2009 following the 
Trial Court's entry of the Order Granting Petition to Compel the Estate to sell the real estate owned 
by Cathie. R. Vol. I, Pp. 114-119. On that first appeal, the Department argued that the June 12, 
2008 Order was [mal and had not been timely appealed. R. Vol. I, pp.l45-151. The District Court 
issued its Decision on Appeal on May 26, 2010 holding that the June 12, 2008 Order was 
Interlocutory and not appealable, and further reversing the Trial Court for failing to set forth 
1 After the July 28, 2009 Petition to Compel Sale, the Department conceded that subject matter 
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adequate fmdings of fact. In doing so, the District Court noted " .. , trial court must have concluded 
that it had jurisdiction over real property which is vested in a person who is not a party to the 
proceeding, as well as the real property itself which mayor may not be vested in the estate. No 
explanation was provided as to how these conclusions were reached." R. VoL n, p.10. The 
Department did not appeal the District Court's Decision on Appeal. 
"The doctrine of the 'law of the case' is well established in Idaho and provides that 'upon an 
appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of 
law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be 
adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent 
appeaL .. '" Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 514, 5 P.3d 973, 975 (2000); quoting Suitts v. 
First Security Bank, 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, l380 (1985). The Department raised the 
issue to the District Court that the Estate had not timely appealed the June 12, 2008, Order. The 
District Court determined on appeal that the June 12, 2008, Order was interlocutory and the 
Department did not appeal that ruling. The ruling of Judge Verby is the law of the case and the 
Department cannot raise that issue at this time. 
As the District Court's Decision on Appeal notes, Cathie was not a party to the proceedings. 
The Court noted this as a basis for reversing and remanding with instructions to make fmdings on 
this and other issues necessary to the Department's attempt to compel the sale of the Property 
owned by Cathie.2 Cathie only personally appeared through counsel by special appearance on 
September 23,2010, noting and reserving issues of 'Jurisdiction, venue, service of process, and due 
jurisdiction for partition of the Property lay only in District Court. 9/29111 Tr. pp. 41-43. 
2 The Department has since reversed its position and concedes that a District Court Petition 
action is required, rendering moot the Order Compelling Sale of the property. 
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process, pursuant to LR.C.P 49(i)(2) .... " R. Vol. II, Pp. 254-5. The Demand for Notice and 
Special Appearance also gives notice to the Department that orders (such as the June 12, 200S 
Order) were entered without due process upon Cathie and should be vacated. 
D. Melvin's Life Estate is Not an Estate Asset Subject to Recovery Under Idaho 
Code § 56-218(4). 
According to the Department, Idaho Code § 56-218(4) abrogated the common law 
principles that a life estate ceases to exist at the moment of death. The Department asserts that life 
estates are an asset of the decedent after death, but must be valued as of moments prior to death. 
It is clear that Idaho Code § 56-218(4) subsection (a) simply acknowledges that assets of the 
estate includes all assets defined by state probate law. Idaho Code § 56-21S(4)(a). In other words, 
it acknowledges the probate definitions of property as "anything that may be the subject of 
ownership". Idaho Code §15-1-201(3S)(2013). Subsection (a) does not modifY the common law as 
to life estates. Idaho Code § 15-3-706 requires the personal representative to inventory only 
"property owned by the decedent at the time of his death." I.e. § 15-3-706 (2013). 
In addressing subsection (b), the Department's Brief emphasizes the term "life estate". 
Respondent's Brief, P.ll. However, the subsection should be read carefully for what it actually 
says: "Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had anv legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest) ..... " This phrase, in and of itself, 
does nothing to redefine the common law that provides that a lite estate expires on death and, 
therefore, decedent has no interest in a life estate "at the time of death".3 
3 The Department inconsistently asserts that the life estate must be valued "at the moment before 
death". Resp. Brief, p.13 
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The remainder of (b) provides " .. .including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement." 
A strict reading of the statute reveals that Melvin never conveyed to Cathie "through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship [or] life estate". Rather, Melvin conveyed all title to 
Cathie in 2001 retaining to himself a life estate. Melvin could have conveyed the Property to Cathy 
a life estate interest using his or another person's life as the measuring life and the Property would 
clearly be within the defInition of (b). 
The Legislature could have clearly abrogated the common law that a life estate terminates 
on death by stating in (b) "including assets in which the individual (applicant) retains a life estate". 
But the Legislature did not do so. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the common law will not be abrogated or modifIed 
based upon "presumed" intent of the legislature or upon "doubtful implication". Ind. Indem. Co. v. 
Columbia Basin Steel & Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 723, 471 P.2d 574,578 (1970) 
The Department urges their interpretation of subsection (b) because it furthers the policy of 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 that Medicaid be a payor of last resort, but policy 
arguments aside, the Court cannot presume the state legislative intent to abrogate common law 
from doubtful implication or less than explicit language. "The court has no more right to abrogate 
common law than it has to repeal the statutory law." Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, _, 151 P.2d 
765, 772 (1944)[ overruled on other grounds] 
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This long accepted rule of interpreting statutes in light of common law is equally applicable 
to the last phrase of subsection (b): "or other arrangement". District Judge Brudie on appeal 
determined that this provision was sweeping enough to encompass a modification of common law 
principles of life estate and to allow for them to be included as estate assets and valued as of 
moments "before death", as suggested by the Department. R.Vol.III, pp.535-536. 
1. Case Law 
There is no Idaho case law specifically interpreting subsection (b). The Department directs 
the Court to two (2) cases from other jurisdictions: Department of Human Services v. Willingham, 
136 P.3d 66 (2006) and In Re Estate ofLaughead, 696 NW 2d, 312 (Iowa, 2005). Both are 
distinguishable from these circumstances. 
a. In Re Laughead. 
In Laughead, the Iowa Court was asked to interpret its Medicaid recovery statute. The 
statute in effect when Ruby Laughead died and applied by the Iowa Supreme Court, explicitly 
provided that for purposes of Medicaid recovery, the estate included 'jointly held property, retained 
ute estates, and interests in trusts." In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N. W.2d 312, 315 (2005) 
The Iowa Court discussed the statutory definition of "retained life estates" and concluded 
that Iowa's statutory Medicaid provision allowed recovery against the life estate Laughead held at 
death. Idaho's statute contains no such provision. The Laughead decision is distinguishable and 
provides no support for the Department's argument 
b. Willingham. 
Department of Human Services v. Willingham, 136 P.3d 66 (2006) is also distinguishable 
because of the issues raised in that appeaL In 1993, Willingham conveyed his property to his son 
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reserving a life estate. In 1995, the Oregon legislature adopted its version of the Medicaid recovery 
statute which is similar, but not identical, to Idaho's. More importantly, on appeal, the Son argued 
that the legislative provision (adopted in1995) could not be retroactively applied to the 1993 
conveyance and contract between Father and Son. Perhaps as a result ofthe retroactive application 
issue presented by the Son, the Oregon Court makes no significant analysis of the statutory 
language and how it abrogates common law and spends all of the decision analyzing retroactive 
application of the statute and the Son's constitutional challenges. 
Additionally, Oregon's statutes specifically address life estates as an estate asset and how 
they should be measured in the estate at the time of death. Willingham, 136 P.3d at 70. Further, 
Oregon's administrative regulation apparently specifically directs courts to include and value life 
estates held by the recipient at the time of their death and how it is to be valued irrespective of the 
actual lifespan of the measuring life. Willingham, 206 Or.App.156, 164-5, 136 P.3d 66, 70 (2006); 
citing OAR 461-135-0845.4 
For the reasons set forth above, the Department's reliance on Laughead and Willingham is 
misplaced. Both cases are distinguishable by the issues presented on appeal and because each 
state's legislative and regulatory rules contain language that specifically include life estates for 
Medicaid recovery purposes or specifically indicate a legislative intent to abrogate common law 
principles pertaining to life estates. 
4 This is also relevant to the second half of Appellant's argument wherein Cathie challenges use 
of the Asset Transfer Penalty Table found in LD.A.P.A. 16.03.05.837 also referenced as Rule 
837 in Appellant's Brief, p.lO. 
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E. There is no Idaho Authority for Valuing a Life Estate "At the Moment Before 
Death" in the Estate of the Decedent. 
The Department relies upon Laughead in asserting that Melvin's life estate must be valued 
at the moment before his death. As indicated above, Laughead relies upon a statute that 
unequivocally abrogates common law by including "retained life estates" in probate assets for 
purposes of Medicaid recovery. The Department does not cite this Court to a single precedential 
case or statute for their contention. 
Common law and Idaho law is clear that a life estate terminates at death and is not deemed 
an asset of decedent's estate under the probate provisions. Tobias v. State Tax Commission, 85 
Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, (1963); 121 Am.Jur. Proof Proof of Facts 3d, 101 (2011); 
Idaho Code § 15-3-706 [inventory includes that owned by the decedent at the time of his death]. 
The Department's argument that Melvin's life estate must be valued "moments before death" is 
unsupported by Idaho law. 
Following Idaho Code §15-3-706, if Melvin's life estate is an asset of the estate under I.C. 
§56-218(4)(b), than it is to be valued at its "fair market value as of the date of the decedent's 
death", not "moments before" his death as suggested by the Department. This Court should reverse 
the Trial Courts Decision and Order. 
F. The Department Offers No Justification for Use of Rule 837, the Medicaid 
Asset Transfer Penalty Tables. 
Before Cathie appeared individually (reserving jurisdictional issues), the Estate sought 
Court approval for retention of an appraiser to value Melvin's life estate as of the date of death. 
The Department objected and the Trial Court agreed allowing only a "preliminary, tentative, short 
form appraisal of the fee simple value ... ", an essentially useless valuation for purposes of the life 
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estate issue. R. Vol. I, Pp. 81-2. At hearing, the Department insisted that the only method of 
valuing the life estate was application of the Asset Transfer Penalty Table referred to as Rule 837. 
The Respondent's Brief provides no response to the fact that the Asset Transfer Penalty 
Table is, by its terms, to be applied to the applicant "at the time of application" for benefits. 
IDAP A 16.03.05. The Department provides no reconciliation for the obvious, an applicant subject 
to Rule 837 is a living person with a viable life expectancy while Melvin's estate assets must be 
valued as of the date of death,5 except to argue that the Court should value the asset as if Melvin 
were alive. 
For the reasons set forth above, the use of Rule 837 was an erroneous valuation by the Trial 
Court and constitutes reversible error. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions to 
value Melvin's life estate at the time of his death through the use of an appropriate, qualified expert. 
I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.831 et. seq. provided the Department an opportunity at the time Melvin applied 
for benefits (evidence not found in the record) to scrutinize any prior transfers within the look-back 
period of thirty-six (36) months for less than "fair market value". LD.A.P.A. 16.03.05.835.01 
(2013). 
The Department has the right to penalize the applicant if such an asset transfer occurred 
within the look-back period by imposing an asset penalty transfer of "restricted medical coverage". 
LD.A.P.A. 16.03.05.832 (2013) The applicant must be notified and the restricted coverage must be 
limited to a period of time based on a valuation of the asset transferred computed by the average 
cost of nursing facility services. LD.A.P.A. 16.03.05.834 (2013) 
5 The Department states that it is "undisputed" that Melvin began receiving benefits within the 
look-back period. There is no record to support that assertion and if it were true, why didn't the 
Department apply Rule 837 when Melvin applied for benefits. In any event, it does not resolve 
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Nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme provides the Department authority to 
retroactively apply these penalties against Cathie after Melvin's death. 
In this case, the Department provides no record that an asset transfer penalty was or should 
have been applied to Melvin at the time of his application for Medicaid benefits. In fact, in the 
absence of a record the Court should assume that this scrutiny was perfonned and addressed at the 
time of Melvin's application for benefits. The Department now asserts it should utilize these 
penalty provisions retroactively by valuing Melvin's life estate as an asset of Melvin's estate 
according to the tables found in Rule 837. 
There is no legal authority to do this and the Trial Court erred in adopting the Department's 
argument and method of valuing the life estate. 
G. Attorneys' Fees on Appeal 
The Department argues under Idaho Code § 12-117 that it is entitled to attorneys' fees. It is 
clear that this matter is a case of first impression, as neither the Department nor Cathie has cited the 
Court to any Idaho law directly on point to the issues set forth in this appeal. In matters of first 
impression, neither party is entitled to attorneys' fees. It is clear that this matter is a case of first 
impression, as neither the Department nor Cathie has cited the Court to any Idaho case law on the 
matters set forth in this appeal. In matters of first impression, neither party is entitled to attorneys' 
fees. Trunnell v. Fergel, 153 Idaho 68, 278, P.3d 938 (2012). However, given the absurd and 
nonsensical arguments of the Department, Appellant seeks attorneys' fees on the basis that 
Respondent has acted frivolously and unreasonably under I.C. § 12-117 and § 12-121. 
the illogical application of Rule 837 to value a life estate on death. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 12 
For these reasons, this Court should not award attorney's fees and costs to the Respondent 
on appeaL 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re Value of Estate and remand with instructions that the life estate is not an 
estate asset or, in the alternative, that the life estate be properly valued as of the date of Melvin's 
death by an appraiser or other qualified expert. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2014. 
FEATHERS~WF 
// 
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/ 
Attorney for Cathie Peterson 
Individually 
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